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Recently, in Afghanistan’s deep south, a senior Taliban commander has yet 
again eluded the Afghan government, U.S. and coalition forces. This was done 
not through force of arms, superior knowledge of the terrain, or foreign 
assistance, but through corruption. For a measly US $15,000, an Afghan National 
Security Directorate official gave the commander his freedom and the ability to 
strike at Afghan government and coalition forces yet again. Sadly, this marked 
the third occasion this commander had bribed his way around justice.1 
Despite the successful removal of the Taliban in 2001, followed by democratic 
elections in 2004, the government of Afghanistan continues to fight for 
legitimacy.  Since 2003 the Taliban and other anti-government groups have 
managed to stage an effective insurgency against both the Afghan government 
and their international partners.2  As the security situation has deteriorated 
across the southern and eastern portions of the country, the legitimacy of the 
government has become increasingly dubious.  Counterinsurgent operations 
conducted jointly by Afghan and ISAF/US forces have struggled to restore 
security and shore up popular support for the government.  These important 
legitimizing efforts, however, are rendered near useless in the face of rampant 
corruption throughout the body politic of Afghanistan.   
 
1 Alastair Leithead, “’Bribes’ free top Taleban leader,” BBC News, January 8, 2008. at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/7176807.stm, accessed on January 8, 2008. 
2 Antonio Giustozzi, Koran, Kalashnikov, and Laptop: The Neo-Taliban Insurgency in Afghanistan, New 
York: Columbia University Press, 2008. 
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 Corruption in Afghanistan has reached a level that threatens to offset any 
gains in other, more traditional, counterinsurgency operations.  According to 
Transparency International’s 2007 Corruption Perceptions Index, Afghanistan 
scored a dismal 1.8 out of 10 in terms of honesty in government, ranking 172 out 
of 180 countries.  Corruption runs rampant from the highest levels of 
government to the lowliest foot soldier in the Afghan National Police.  Following 
a public and international outcry, President Hamid Karzai, in an attempt to 
regain some moral authority, publicly acknowledged that corruption has slowed 
reconstruction efforts.3  During a meeting with local leaders, one elderly Afghan 
told Karzai,  
“The government and cabinet members are sucking the blood of innocent 
people, we can’t tolerate the corruption in every government office.”4 
 
Persistent, unbridled corruption will continue to drain whatever legitimacy the 
government has or may obtain.  Corruption forces people to pay more for merely 
living in the country, it funds insurgents and lawless warlords through the 
opium and weapons trades, it weakens the economy and it lowers the overall 
quality of life for the overwhelming majority of the population.  The fight against 
corruption must be an integral component of any counterinsurgency strategy in 
Afghanistan.  Failure to bring corruption under control will further weaken an 
already struggling central government in Kabul. 
 This paper will attempt to describe the corruption as it is occurring in 
Afghanistan and the adverse consequences such corruption has on 
reconstruction and development.  The first section will explore briefly the 
theoretical underpinnings of the causes and consequences of corruption.  Next, it 
will examine specific and general instances of corruption in Afghanistan.  In the 
 
3 Ron Synovitz, “Afghanistan: Karzai’s Corruption Comments Could Lead to Cabinet Shakeup,” Radio 
Free Europe/Radio Liberty, November 16, 2007, at http://www.rferl.org, accessed on 30 November 2007. 
4 Hamid Shalizi, “Corruption Rife in Afghanistan: President,” Reuters, November 13, 2007, at 
http://www.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idUSISL21150920071113, accessed on 30 November 2007. 
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concluding section it will point to specific consequences of corruption in 
Afghanistan. 
 
Corruption and Theory 
 
Causes 
 In the vast majority of cases, “corruption is a crime of calculation, not 
passion.”5  Those who engage in corruption weigh the risks and benefits of doing 
so.  If the reward is high enough to outweigh the risks, it is likely that corruption 
will take place.6    Bryan Husted suggested a number of hypotheses regarding 
causes and contributing factors linked to corruption.  Three stand out for the case 
at hand.  First, the further the population is removed from the political power 
center, the greater the potential for high levels of corruption.  Government 
officials free from the oversight of an active civil society are more likely to 
engage in acts of corruption.  Second, societies which face a significant degree of 
uncertainty regarding their future security and well-being are more likely to 
engage in corruption in order to provide at least a degree of certainty.7  Third, 
Husted suggests that a masculine culture, which is more focused on material 
success, will experience higher levels of corruption.  Ineffective and weak 
governments, which are associated with the first two hypotheses, contribute to 
corruption as people and officials resort to bribery to determine who receives the 
limited attention and resources of the state.8  It is also important to note “petty 
 
5 Robert Klitgaard, “International Cooperation on Combating Corruption,” New Perspectives on Combating 
Corruption, (Washington, DC: Transparency International and the World Bank, 2007): 46. 
6 Omar Azfar, Young Lee, and Anand Swamy, “The Causes and Consequences of Corruption,” Annals of 
the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 753, Culture and Development: International 
Perspectives (January 2001): 51. 
7 Bryan W. Husted, “Wealth, Culture, and Corruption,” Journal of International Business Studies, Vol. 30, 
No. 2 (2nd Quarter, 1999): 343-354. 
8 Mitchell A. Seligson, “The Impact of Corruption on Regime Legitimacy: A Comparative Study of Four 
Latin American Countries,” The Journal of Politics, Vol. 64, No. 2 (May 2002): 413. 
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corruption…is linked to higher level systematic and systemic forms of 
corruption.”9 
As the Afghanistan Human Development Report 2007 points out, “post-
conflict countries are particularly vulnerable to corruption because of weak 
government institutions and the inability to ensure the rule of law.”10  Based on 
the proposed causes of corruption above, it is understandable why Afghanistan 
has proven such a fertile breeding ground for corruption.  The overthrow of the 
Taliban in 2001, after decades of war, did not lead to an era of stability or 
development.  Rather, it has given way to another round of insurgency warfare 
aimed at disrupting all attempts to restore order.  For most Afghans, the future 
remains extremely uncertain.  Additionally, over three decades of war have 
upset traditional political structures.  Village elders and the role of the shura have 
been replaced, or reduced in their effectiveness, by local warlords and militant 
Islamists, i.e. the Taliban.11  At the same time, the new democratic political 
structure, at the local and national level, seems removed from the concerns of the 
average citizen.  Despite the elections of 2004, civil society in Afghanistan largely 
remains the province of the elite, with the general population distant from the 
center of political power.  The current government remains weak and ineffective, 
forcing citizens and officials to work out their own unofficial methods for the 
delivery of services.  Finally, the Afghan culture is heavily patriarchal, with 
notions of honor in part determined by status relative to peers.12 This in turn 
encourages cutting corners and the disregard of processes in favor of end results. 
 
 
9 Stephen P. Riley, “Petty Corruption and Development,” Development in Practice, Vol. 9, No. ½ 
(February 1999): 190. 
10 Center for Policy and Human Development, Afghanistan Human Development Report 2007, (Islamabad: 
Army Press, 2007): 61. 
11 Thomas H. Johnson , “Understanding the Pakistan-Afghanistan Border,” a paper prepared for delivery at 
the Conference on Ungoverned Spaces, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, August 2-3, 2007: 34-
35. 
12 Dupree, Afghanistan, 181.  The Pashtun code of honor, or Pashtunwali, in many ways wrapped up in a 
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Consequences 
 Corruption, especially when open and widespread, can have a deleterious 
impact on a state’s economy, the population’s quality of life, the rule of law, and 
in the end call into question the legitimacy of the government.  In terms of 
economics, studies have indicated that corruption “reduces investment and 
slows growth.”13  Corruption can force businesses underground, which in turn 
reduces tax revenues, thus, further reducing the ability of the government to 
operate effectively.  Bribes also can have the same effect as officials distribute 
state resources without proper collection of fees for services.  Investment will fall 
as business plans and cash flows are impacted by the cost of payouts and bribes.  
As Mitchell Seligson suggests, “when corruption increases by two points on a 
ten-point scale, GDP decreases by 0.5% and investment decreases by 4%.”14 
 Corruption often hits the low-income portion of society the hardest “when 
measured by the bribes/income ratio.”15  Where corruption is rampant, its 
greatest effect is felt at the juncture where citizens interact with government 
officials—the arena of public services and health.  The poor are forced to pay 
more with less while dealing with a government that does not meet the needs of 
everyone.  Individuals and families are forced to choose between competing 
necessities with very limited resources.  Often health and nutritional needs are 
inadequately met, as people are forced make concessions just to make a living.  
This, in turn, will result in increased health, education, and employment 
problems that overwhelm already weak government institutions.  The cycle, 
once begun, becomes increasingly difficult to break.  As Stephen Riley points out, 
corruption “reinforces the current unequal distribution of opportunities and 
undermines basic human rights.”16 
 
13 Seligson, 409-410. 
14 Seligson, 409-412.  Seligson also details the effects of bribes on a society.  See also Azfar, Lee and 
Swamy, 46. 
15 Azfar, Lee and Swamy, 48. 
16 Riley, 190. 
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 As corruption spreads the rule of law breaks down.  Rule of law is tied 
directly to economic performance, state capability and government legitimacy.  
Rule-of-law guarantees personal freedoms and rights.  Corruption breaks down 
the responsibility and accountability of the government in ensuring these rights.  
Without responsibility and accountability the state begins to exist not to meet the 
needs of the entire population, but to provide opportunities for the elite and 
government officials.17  Populations faced with the consequences of corruption 
are apt to lose their faith in their government officials, if not in the very system of 
government.   Falling public confidence in government exacerbates the problem 
as the population is forced to act as “clients and bribers who look for private 
protection to gain access to decision-makers.”18  The loss of legitimacy, 
ultimately, can bring the state to a halt or lead to worse consequences.  Seligson 
writes  that: 
“In order for political systems to function reasonably well, actions taken by 
leaders need to be viewed as legitimate.  If not, the ‘degrees of freedom’ with 
which decision makers have to operate are reduced considerably.  
Immobilism is a potential outcome of political systems in which the mass 
public does not believe in the legitimacy of the system.”19 
 
Even worse that the “immobilism” mentioned by Seligson is the potential 
downfall of a government or the state.  Such a scenario is particularly true for a 
state like Afghanistan. 
 
Corruption: A National Cancer 
 
 Afghanistan’s corruption has taken on epidemic proportions, and infects 
everyday life to a tragic degree.  Government positions are often sold to the 
highest bidder.  Warlords and drug barons work closely with bureaucrats and 
police at all levels.  Even Afghanistan’s international partners who are engaged 
in military, reconstruction and humanitarian operations are unable to escape the 
 
17 Center for Policy and Human Development, 39. 
18 Seligson, 413. 
19 Seligson, 429. 
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stain of corruption.  It is important to reiterate the current state of affairs in 
Afghanistan.  The government and its international partners are involved in 
counterinsurgency efforts against a determined foe.  Every action of the Taliban 
and other insurgents is aimed at discrediting and de-legitimatizing the Afghan 
government.20  The effects of corruption on public perception of the government 
must be considered in this light.  A 2005 survey of the Afghan people indicated 
“76% of people perceive corruption as high in the judiciary, and 71% perceive it 
as frequent in the administrative services.”21  The same survey suggested that 
nearly half of Afghan households had paid on average US $100 in bribes, which 
is significant when the average GDP per capita is around US $960.22   
Corruption occurs not only at the level of the lowly bureaucrat but also at 
the highest levels of government.  In a recent report, distinguished war 
correspondent Anthony Loyd highlights the fact that several police officers have 
named “General Azzam, recently appointed Chief of Operations after his stint as 
Chief of Staff, and his deputy General Reshad as the prime recipients of 
bribes.”23  The same report hints at rumors by senior government officials that 
President Karzai’s brother Wali, “head of Kandahar’s provincial council…[has] a
key role in orchestrating the movement of heroin from Kandahar eastward 
through Helmand and out across the Iranian border.”24  While not all accusa
of corruption aimed at government officials are based on hard evidence, both th
public and bureaucrats suspect everyone of being involved. 
In Afghanistan opium is king.  Current estimates put the revenue from the 
opium trade at somewhere near half of the country’s GDP.25  The dollar figures 
 
20 The U.S. Army-Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual, (Chicago: The University of Chicago 
Press, 2007): 2. 
21 Center for Policy and Human Development, 61. 
22 Center for Policy and Human Development, 61. 
23 Anthony Loyd, “Corruption, Bribes and Trafficking: A Cancer That is Engulfing Afghanistan,” 
TimesOnline, November 24, 2007), at http://www.timesonline.co.uk/, accessed on 30 November 2007. 
24 Loyd. 









                                                                                                                                                
involved are staggering when considering the state of the general economy and 
the income of the average Afghan family.  Already approximately 14.3% of the 
Afghan people are involved in the opium trade, and in some provinces up to 
80% of all families derive income from the crop.26 It has become common 
practice for government positions especially along prime drug smuggling rout
to be sold for larges sums of money.27  One general was appointed chief of police 
in an important drug smuggling province after he paid the asking price of
hundred fifty thousand in hard currency.  Unfortunately for the general, he 
misunderstood the details of the interaction and paid in afghanis rather than 
with the expected US dollars.  He was promptly thrown out of office.  Some 
within the Afghan government have rated the country’s provinces according the 
profitability of official positions in connection with the drug trade.  Police 
positions in a top-rated province can cost upwards of US $300,000.  As Anthony 
Loyd reports, the return on investment can be significant with some estimates 
indicating that some “counter-narcotic officials…take home $400,000 a month 
from heroin smuggling.”28  Also, in November 2007, 10 high-ranking counter-
narcotics officials within the Ministry of Interior were detained “for 
misappropriating three million afghanis and US $47,000.” 29  The Center for 
Policy and Human Development did not overstate the situation when they 
 
&urlStr=/pictures/&directory=/configData/Pictures/&edition=US, accessed  November 14, 2006, “Poppy 
profits fuel Taliban,” CNN, May 22, 2007, at 
http://www.cnn.com/2007/WORLD/asiapcf/05/21/afghan.drugs.ap/index.html, accessed June 1, 2007, and 
Priya Abraham, “Where Poppies Grow,” World Magazine, 12 May 2007, at 
http://www.worldmag.com/articles/12924, accessed May 7, 2007. 
26 Afghanistan Opium Survey 2007, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, September 2006, 
www.unodc.org/pdf/execsummaryafg.pdf (accessed September 1, 2007). 
27 Azfar, Lee and Swamy write that “an indication that corruption has become endemic is when government 
jobs begin to be sold.  The price of the job then depends on its remuneration, including bribes.”  See Azfar, 
Lee and Swamy, 48. 
28 Loyd. 
29 Pajhwok Afghan News, “10 Police Officers Detained on Embezzlement Charges,” (November 26, 2007), 
at http://www.afghanistannewscenter.com, accessed on 4 December 2007. 
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wrote, “the opium economy is a source of corruption and undercuts public 
institutions, particularly those in the security and justice sectors.”30 
Corruption among local police often has a direct impact on the 
population.  As another work produced by the Program for Culture and Conflict 
Studies states: 
“Equal enforcement of the law is not occurring where the police meet the 
population.  Bribes and extortion are demanded from the public, at 
checkpoints and traffic stops for missing documents or as ‘taxes.’   Taxi 
drivers are often forced to pay traffic police in Kabul between $0.20 and $6 
each day.  A recent survey suggests that the average Afghan household pays 
an average of $100 annually in bribes.  With a per capita GDP of only 
approximately $300, bribes are especially harmful to the Afghan population.  
Police are also known to be involved in crimes at the local level, occasionally 
engaging in brutal and violent treatment of the population.”31 
 
Afghanistan’s warlords also contribute significantly to the level of 
corruption across the country.  Three decades of war and the decline of 
traditional Afghan culture contributed to the rise of the warlords.  From the 
period of the Soviet invasion through the rise of the Taliban to the present, many 
of today’s warlords have funded their militias and ventures with the help of 
outside sources, criminal activity and on the backs of local populations.  The 
result was the creation of competing powerbases and significant roadblocks to 
the formation of a strong central government.  While many of the current 
generation of warlords were temporarily co-opted or sidelined by the rise of the 
Taliban, they have returned with a vengeance.  As a new government was 
formed following the US sponsored routing of the Taliban, Hamid Karzai was 
encouraged by Zalmay Khalilzad “to ‘co-opt’ the warlords in pursuit of ‘peace,’ 
ignoring justice.”32  Consequently, the very warlords who prevented the creation 
of an effective government following the withdrawal of Soviet troops were 
 
30 Center for Policy and Human Development, 60. 
31 Program for Culture and Conflict Studies, Afghan National Police: Appendix, at 
http://www.nps.edu/programs/ccs/, accessed on 30 December 2007. 
32 Somali Kolhatkar and James Ingalls, Bleeding Afghanistan: Washington, Warlords, and the Propaganda 
of Silence, (New York: Seven Stories Press, 2006): 161. 
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invited to openly participate in the political process.  The human rights violations 
and crimes committed by these warlords continue to mitigate many of the 
government and coalition good works.33  
Since the formation of the interim government several of Afghanistan’s 
worst warlords have served as governors, parliamentarians, cabinet members, 
and military leaders.  In large part they have brought their past professions with 
them into government service.  Intimidation of the population continued 
beginning with the elections as people were informed by warlords’ organizations 
the necessity of voting properly.34  There are strong indications that suggest 
some of these former warlords, now officials of the Afghan government are 
directly involved in the opium trade.35  Additionally, evidence and rumors 
suggest that US and British forces have made secret payments to warlords in 
order to secure their loyalty to the current government.36  In her book, The 
Punishment of Virtue, Sarah Chayes details many of Gul Agha Sherzai’s m
egregious acts of corruption in his official capacity as governor of both Kandahar
and Nangarhar provinces and as a cabinet minister.  Sherzai is a class act, who
governor of Kandahar withheld customs revenues from the central government 
and was then rewarded with a position in Karzai’s cabinet.  While in Kandahar
he withheld funds sent by the central government, which were intended as 
wages for the Afghan National Police.37  Ismail Khan also was accused of 
withholding over $100 million in customs while he was governor of H
Illegal land appropriation from the poor has also become common among forme
 
33 Graeme Smith, “From Canadian custody into cruel hands,” Globe and Mail, April 23, 2007, at 
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/story/RTGAM.20070423.wdetainee23/BNStory/Afghanistan/hom
e/?pageRequested=1, accessed on January 8, 2008. 
34 Kolhatkar and Ingalls, 150. 
35 Sarah Chayes, The Punishment of Virtue: Inside Afghanistan After the Taliban, (New York: Penguin 
Press, 2006): 163 and 273.  See also Kolhatkar and Ingalls, 108-112. 
36 Kevin Savage, Lorenzo Delesgues, Ellen Martin, and Gul Pacha Ulfat, “Corruption, Perceptions and 
Risks in Humanitarian Assistance: An Afghanistan Case Study,” Humanitarian Policy Group Working 
Paper, July 2007, at http://www.odi.org.uk/hpg/papers/WPcorruptionafghanistan.pdf, accessed on 
December 5, 2007. 
37 Chayes, 182-183 and 313 
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warlords turned government officials.  Local warlords frequently work as 
contractors for reconstruction efforts, often keeping large sums of money
their own pu
Regrettably, the continued influence of the warlords is linked not only to 
the Afghan government but also to the United States and other partner nations.  
Over the past six years, the Afghan population has watched with difficulty as the 
authority of the warlords has been legitimized.  These are the same warlords 
whose gross disregard for their fellow Afghans made the Taliban initially 
acceptable to a significant portion of the population.  Common sense suggests 
that any serious counterinsurgent efforts to legitimize the government are 
reduced in effectiveness by the inclusion of former warlords, many of who 
remain wanton criminals, in the new government structure.  The legitimacy of 
both the Afghan government and its international partners suffers due to their 
willing association with these warlords. 
It is important to highlight the fact that the stain of corruption is not 
limited to the fabric of the Afghan government.  The perception of corruption 
also casts its shadow on international aid organizations and the foreign military 
forces, which comprise NATO and other allied partners in the country. Post-
conflict countries often are susceptible to corruption due to pressure to spend aid 
dollars quickly, limited state capacity to enforce the law and a lack of security.  
Construction work and contracting, where promises and cash are quickly 
exchanged with little to no oversight, are especially predisposed to corruption.39  
As indicated above foreign militaries, to include those of the United States and 
Canada, cooperate directly with warlords on issues of security and contracting 
 
38 Mike Blanchfield and Andrew Mayeda, “Defense Department Conceals Afghan Business Deals,” 
CanWest News Service, (November 19, 2007), at 
http://www.canada.com/topics/news/story.html?id=1cd49a86-b77b-40b3-9190-2f9d36b79d7b&k=97275, 
accessed on November 30, 2007. 
39 Kevin Savage, Lorenzo Delesgues, Ellen Martin, and Gul Pacha Ulfat, “Corruption, Perceptions and 
Risks in Humanitarian Assistance: An Afghanistan Case Study,” Humanitarian Policy Group Working 
Paper, July 2007, at http://www.odi.org.uk/hpg, accessed on December 5, 2007.  According to the authors  
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for various services.  Journalists Mike Blanchfield and Andrew Mayeda point to 
the unwillingness of the Canadian forces to disclose the names of all the 
indigenous companies with which they do business in Afghanistan.  Their 
investigations revealed, “at least 29 contracts, totaling $1.14 million, went to a 
corporate entity known as ‘Sherzai,’ raising the question of whether the contracts 
were awarded to Gul Agha Sherzai,” a provincial governor.40  At the same time 
private security companies, most often employed by foreign nations or the 
Afghan government, have come under fire in Afghanistan for their illegal 
practices.  A number of these firms have been linked with crimes ranging from 
bank robbery to drug smuggling and everything in between.  It is assumed by 
many that warlords have transformed their militias into private security firms in 
order to maintain their private armies.41  Reconstruction efforts and 
humanitarian aid is also tainted.  Recent estimates indicate that local Afghan 
leaders steal roughly half of all aid money is used for purposes other than what it 
was intended for.  One source within the Pentagon reportedly suggests that 
Afghan “police officers had stolen and sold at least half of the equipment 
supplied by the US, including thousands of cars and trucks.”42  Blame for 
corruption in the reconstruction process and the distribution of aid is cast at 
“local officials, commanders and non-governmental organizations.”43 
 
40 Blanchfield and Mayeda. 
41 Susanne Schmeidl and Lisa Rimli, “Private Security Companies and Local Populations: An Exploratory 
Study of Afghanistan and Angola,” Swisspeace, (November 2007), at 
http://www.swisspeace.ch/typo3/fileadmin/user_upload/pdf/Executive_Summary_PSC_and_local_populati
on.pdf, accessed on December 4, 2007.  See also Aunohita Mojumdar, “Nobody Guarding Afghanistan’s 
Guards,” Asia Times Online, November 21, 2007, at 
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/IK21Df01.html, accessed on November 30, 2007. 
42 Gethin Chamberlain, “US Military: Afghan Leaders Steal Half of All Aid,” The Sunday Telegraph, 
January 28, 2007, at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2007/01/28/wafg28.xml, 
accessed January 8, 2008. 
43 “Afghanistan: Some Aid Vulnerable to Mismanagement, Corruption, Say Experts,” IRIN, October 4, 
2007, at http://www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportId=74635, accessed January 9, 2008. 
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 Stories of corruption and those involved, unfortunately, could fill 
volumes.  In understanding the current plague, two major points assert 
themselves.  First, corruption in Afghanistan may well lose the war for the 
Afghan government, the United States and the other partner nations.  As David 
Rohde states in The New York Times: 
“Some current and former American and Afghans officials warn that 
corruption, drug trafficking and the rising lawlessness pose graver threats to 
the government than even the Taliban.”44 
  
 If corruption remains unchecked by the Afghan government, or its 
international partners, legitimacy in the eyes of the population may never be 
obtained.  How can the current government be considered acceptable when it so 
openly contradicts what it says?  As long as law and order remain separate from 
reality, it is unlikely the Afghan people will respect either the system of 
government or the people within it.  Second, it is important to understand the 
malignant nature of corruption when it is allowed to run unchecked.  Corruption 
has a spiral effect of worsening the situation in an already tenuous situation.  It 
decreases economic opportunities and increases uncertainty for the bulk of the 
population.  Chris Alexander, a special representative of the United Nations in 
Kabul stated, “Corruption is the No. 1 obstacle to peace and economic prosperity 
in Afghanistan.”45 
 Today the future of Afghanistan remains uncertain.  Despite significant 
progress in the creation of a democratically elected government, ultimate success 
 
44 David Rohde, “Overhaul of Afghan Police is New Priority,” The New York Times, October 18, 2007, at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/18/world/asia/18afghan.html?_r=1&oref=slogin, accessed January 9, 
2008. 
45 “Battle Against Corruption Second Front in Afghanistan,” Ottawa Citizen, July 21, 2007, at 
http://www.canadaka.net/news/23155-Battle_against_corruption_second_front_in_Afghanistan, accessed 
January 9, 2008. 
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is distant.  The fight against corruption must become a primary focus of 
counterinsurgency efforts.  Success depends on public support and participation 
in government.  Corruption, however, removes any sense of public ownership or 
civic responsibility in government.  While solutions will require significant and 
painful changes, maintaining the status quo may very well result in defeat. 
  
 
Jarad Van Wagoner is a Research Fellow for the Program of Culture & Conflict Studies 
at the Naval Postgraduate School. 
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